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INTRODUCTION
Abner Greene’s Against Obligation1 and Louis Michael Seidman’s On
Constitutional Disobedience2 offer provocative, subversive, and frequently
convincing arguments against wholesale fidelity to the Constitution. Greene
makes the case that individuals, at times, have no duty to obey the Constitution
as it has been interpreted and articulates a methodology for how the
government should accommodate these legitimate acts of disobedience.
Seidman, however, makes the case that we should abandon the “pernicious
myth” that we are obligated to obey the Constitution at all.3 He argues that if
the fiction of constitutional obedience was jettisoned altogether, the national
discourse about the issues that divide us – like the legality of gun ownership,
affirmative action, and same-sex marriage – would concern the merits of
various approaches to governmental regulation of the issues.4 The discourse
would not hover around the question of whether a particular governmental
regulation comports with the mandates of the Constitution. The latter, existing
discourse is useless and frequently counterproductive, according to Seidman,
as it stymies “the open-ended and unfettered dialogue that is the hallmark of a
free society.”5
This Essay asks a simple, but important, question: What will happen to
abortion access in an era of constitutional infidelity? Will women continue to
be able to terminate unwanted pregnancies if there is no obligation to follow

∗

Associate Professor of Law; Associate Professor of Anthropology, Boston University.
J.D., Columbia Law School; Ph.D., Columbia University Department of Anthropology.
1 ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF AUTHORITY IN A
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2012).
2 LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE (2012).
3 Id. at 9.
4 See id.
5 Id. at 10.
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the dictates of the Constitution? How one answers the question may determine
whether Greene’s and Seidman’s visions of constitutional defiance should be
advocated, pursued, and implemented. That is, if one believes that
governments should not be able to compromise a woman’s ability to undergo
an abortion procedure – even if a majority of citizens believe that no woman
(or only some women, in certain circumstances) should be able to have an
abortion – then one may find Greene’s and Seidman’s proposals unattractive.
And quite terrifying.
At the outset, I should note that many argue that, with respect to abortion
rights, we already live in an era of constitutional infidelity. That is, many
critics of the right to abortion assert that there is nothing in the Constitution
that so much as implies that it is illegitimate for governments to regulate, and
even proscribe, abortion.6 The Court in Roe v. Wade7 was just making stuff up,
they say.8 Accordingly, every time that a federal court strikes down an abortion
regulation as an infringement on an individual’s constitutional right to an
abortion, it is not an act of obedience to the Constitution, but rather an act of
disobedience to the Constitution insofar as the document allows states to
reasonably regulate society, with the exception of a few choice areas that,
through the Bill of Rights, have been exempted from this general maxim.9
6

For a well-known example of the argument that the abortion right has no textual base in
the Constitution and is not otherwise implied by the Constitution, see John Hart Ely, The
Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 935-36 (1973)
(“What is frightening about Roe is that this super-protected right is not inferable from the
language of the Constitution, the framers’ thinking respecting the specific problem in issue,
any general value derivable from the provisions they included, or the nation’s governmental
structure.” (citation omitted)).
7 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8 Roe famously, or perhaps infamously, located the abortion right in a general right of
privacy, the existence of which was not explicitly established by constitutional text, but
rather was suggested by precedents that protected individuals against governmental
intervention in various “private” aspects of an individual’s life. See id. at 152-53 (citing
various cases for the proposition that there exists a “right of privacy” that protects activities
“relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and
education” (citations omitted)). Critics argue not only that the Constitution does not provide
for a “right of privacy,” Bruce Fein, Griswold v. Connecticut: Wayward Decision-Making in
the Supreme Court, 16 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 551, 554-55 (1989) (describing the reasoning in
Griswold as “utterly incomprehensible” and discussing other legal theories independent of
creating a constitutional right to privacy that would have accomplished the same result), but
that even if the Constitution does offer some protection against governmental regulation of
individuals’ private lives, access to abortion does not logically fall within the umbrella of
that protection, see, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 172 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“I have difficulty
in concluding, as the Court does, that the right of ‘privacy’ is involved in this case. Texas,
by the statute here challenged, bars the performance of a medical abortion by a licensed
physician on a plaintiff such as Roe. A transaction resulting in an operation such as this is
not ‘private’ in the ordinary usage of that word.”).
9 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that rational basis review
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Moreover, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,10
which affirmed the “central holding” of Roe,11 did little better than Roe in the
way of convincing naysayers that the Constitution provides for an individual
abortion right.12 Instead of plumbing the depths of constitutional text or
endeavoring to divine the Framers’ original meaning or intent in using the
phrase “due process of law,” Casey fretted over stare decisis.13 It is not unfair
to argue that the Court seemed more concerned with what would happen to the
perception of the Court’s legitimacy if it overturned Roe than with whether
Roe was correctly decided in the first place.14
Nevertheless, at present, we have an abortion right that, by hook or crook,
enjoys some level of constitutional protection.15 As a result, women have
is the proper test for determining whether a law regulating abortion is constitutional and, as
such, stating that courts need only ask the question they ask with respect to all “social and
economic legislation” – that is, whether the law “has a rational relation to a valid state
objective”).
10 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
11 Id. at 879.
12 See, e.g., Clarke D. Forsythe & Stephen B. Presser, The Tragic Failure of Roe v.
Wade: Why Abortion Should Be Returned to the States, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 85, 106
(2005) (“Had the plurality treated seriously some of the other ‘prudential and pragmatic’
questions it enumerated, however, they would have had an ample basis for overruling Roe
[when deciding Casey].”).
13 Casey, 505 U.S. at 854-61 (discussing whether Roe should be upheld under the
principle of stare decisis).
14 Id. at 869 (“A decision to overrule Roe’s essential holding under the existing
circumstances would address error, if error there was, at the cost of both profound and
unnecessary damage to the Court's legitimacy, and to the Nation’s commitment to the rule
of law. It is therefore imperative to adhere to the essence of Roe’s original decision, and we
do so today.”). Interestingly, Seidman cites the doctrine of stare decisis as proof that we
already live in an era of constitutional infidelity:
In the vast majority of these opinions [in which the Court analyzes whether a prior case
should be upheld under the principle of stare decisis], the justices spend little or no
effort examining constitutional text and history. Instead, the justices parse their own
prior decisions. They do so because it is usually these decisions, rather than the
Constitution itself, that will determine the outcome of the case.
SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 85.
15 I describe the abortion right as having “some level” of constitutional protection
because it is unclear where the undue burden standard falls within the tiers of strict scrutiny,
intermediate review, and rational basis review. When the abortion right was first articulated
in Roe, it was clear that the Court conceived of it as a fundamental right. Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). Moreover, consistent with its approach to fundamental rights, the
Court explained that courts should use strict scrutiny when reviewing abortion regulations
and uphold such laws only if the state articulated a compelling interest supporting the
regulation. See id. at 163 (finding that “[w]ith respect to the State’s important and legitimate
interest in the health of the mother, the ‘compelling’ point, in the light of present medical
knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester” and that “[w]ith respect to the
State’s important and legitimate interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at
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access to legal abortion, and those adult women16 with the ability to pay17 can
terminate an unwanted pregnancy before viability. The question, then, is: What
if we accepted Seidman’s and Greene’s arguments that we really do not have a
duty to obey the Constitution? Would women still be able to terminate
pregnancies that they no longer wish to carry?
I.

SEIDMAN-STYLE CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE

In the current era of constitutional obedience, a state law prohibiting
abortions would likely face immediate challenge, and a court would review the
law in order to determine its constitutionality. In an era of Seidman-style

viability”). The trimester framework was the result of different state interests becoming
compelling at different times during pregnancy.
Casey, however, replaced the trimester framework with the undue burden standard. See
Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 (stating that the undue burden standard was the test that courts
should use going forward when reviewing abortion regulations). One thing that is crystal
clear about the test is that it is not strict scrutiny. Id. at 877 (“A finding of an undue burden
is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”). The
question, then, is whether the undue burden standard is closer to intermediate scrutiny or
whether it is no more than a gussied-up rational basis review. See Alan Brownstein, How
Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 867, 881, 917 (1994) (explaining that the Casey plurality’s use of the undue
burden standard amounted to rational basis review and highlighting similarities in the
Court’s language when applying the undue burden or rational basis standards in other types
of cases); Laura J. Tepich, Gonzales v. Carhart: The Partial Termination of the Right to
Choose, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 339, 382 (2008) (stating that the Carhart Court actually used
rational basis review while claiming to use the undue burden standard). It is worth noting
that if, as some argue, the undue burden test is just a species of rational basis review, then
the abortion right is no more of a “right” than our “right” to enter into a contract with our
employers. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (using rational
basis review to uphold a law that interfered with the ability of parties to contract).
16 See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 515-17 (1990) (holding that
requiring minors to prove they are mature and informed before being allowed to obtain an
abortion does not violate their due process rights and that parental consent requirements for
abortions are constitutional as long as there is a judicial bypass procedure); Planned
Parenthood Ass’n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 494 (1983) (upholding parental consent
requirements for minors seeking an abortion); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979)
(holding that states may implement parental consent requirements for minors seeking
abortions so long as there is a an alternate procedure through which the minor may also
obtain consent if the parents disagree).
17 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (upholding the funding restrictions
placed on abortions by the Hyde Amendment and holding that a state is not obligated to pay
for abortions that are not funded due to these restrictions, even if the abortions are medically
necessary); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 465-66 (1977) (holding that a state’s participation
in the Medicaid program does not obligate that state to fund non-medically necessary
abortions).
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constitutional disobedience, however, it is unclear what would happen if the
same law was passed and its legality was challenged. This uncertainty results
from the fact that, in an era of Seidman-style constitutional disobedience,
Marbury v. Madison18 would not necessarily be binding precedent and, as a
consequence, it would be an open question whether courts would retain the
power of judicial review.19 Seidman does not conjecture an answer about the
status of judicial review in an era of constitutional disobedience:
In the absence of constitutional obligation, the decision whether to have
judicial review of this sort would, itself, be grounded in extraconstitutional considerations. I have no idea how the struggle over the
Court’s functions would ultimately be resolved, but at least the argument
would be an honest one about what the Court actually does and what is
actually at stake.20
Accordingly, it is possible that these “extra-constitutional considerations”
would lead to the eradication of judicial review. If so, the hypothetical state
law prohibiting abortion would not be subject to challenge in the courts.
Perhaps a new mechanism would be erected by which Congress, the President,
or an administrative agency would have the power to review a state law and
strike it down if appropriate. Perhaps no mechanism of review would be
erected, and it would impossible for an external body to review a state law
once it has been enacted; only a majority of voters could remove a problematic
law – by voting to have it repealed.
It is also imaginable that “extra-constitutional considerations” would lead to
the maintenance of judicial review. The people could decide that it was in their
best interest that “an elite, deliberative, and reason-giving body should have a
check on the political branches.”21 Importantly, the people would make the
decision to give courts the power to check the political branches with the
knowledge that these courts were not interpreting the Constitution, but rather
were decreeing the legality or illegality of laws based on other “extraconstitutional considerations.”
And what would these “extra-constitutional considerations” be?
Frighteningly, they could be anything. Seidman explains:
Courts exercising this review would presumably resort to some sort of
more general principles to decide the cases before them. Perhaps the
judges would begin with a presumption favoring individual liberty or,
alternatively, with a presumption favoring democratic decision making.
Perhaps they would resort to Kantian or utilitarian theories. Perhaps they
would even refer to biblical teachings.22
18
19
20
21
22

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
See id. at 173-80.
SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 129.
Id.
Id. at 130.
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Those who are fond of abortion rights may find unappetizing a system in
which a woman’s ability to determine whether or not she will become a mother
– and thus, her ability to determine the trajectory of her life – turns on a court
that may be guided by biblical teachings. Also unappetizing, but probably less
so, is a system in which a woman’s access to abortion depends on a court that
favors democratic decisionmaking; those who are fond of abortion rights
characterize access to abortion as a right precisely because doing so removes
the question of abortion access from democratic decisionmaking.23
Furthermore, it is not obvious that abortion rights would fare much better when
contingent on a court that favors Kant, Bentham, or some undefined and openended notion of individual liberty. And, of course, this problem of “extraconstitutional considerations” that would determine the legality or illegality of
abortion laws is not unique to courts and judicial review; it is also present if the
power to review laws resides in Congress, in the executive branch, or with the
voters in a jurisdiction.
Seidman argues that this system – one in which the propriety of all laws,
including abortion regulations, is determined by extra-constitutional
considerations of all varieties – is preferable to the current system, in which the
propriety of laws is determined by resort to constitutional argumentation. He
bases this preference in something he calls “contestability theory,” or the
tendency of a system moored in extra-constitutional considerations to keep
political dialogue going.24 Simply stated, when a person argues that the
hypothetical abortion prohibition is good law because it is consistent with
biblical teachings, another will argue that it is bad law because it is
inconsistent with a theory of individual liberty. When this naysayer makes his
point, another will then pipe up and contend that, according to an alternate
theory of individual liberty, the abortion prohibition is actually good law. At
which point, another will join the dialogue and make the case that the abortion
prohibition is bad law because it is inconsistent with Kantian ethics. In
Seidman’s view, the conversation would continue until the propriety of
abortion access is settled:
Precisely because we all have a stake in maintaining a political
community, our disputes are likely to be resolved one way or the other.
Ultimately, our willingness to reach resolution depends upon our capacity

23

Notably, Seidman doubts that abortion rights in the current era of constitutional
fidelity actually remove the question of abortion access from democratic decisionmaking.
He argues that the contours of the abortion right as fashioned by the Court closely follow the
majority’s opinions about when and for whom abortion should be available. See id. at 33
(“In some of the circumstances where majorities do not favor the [abortion] right – for
example, in cases of poor women who seek state-funded abortions, young women who want
abortions without the consent of their parents, or women who need late-term abortion
procedures – the Court has restricted the right.”).
24 Id. at 136-37.
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for compromise, for transcending self-interest for the benefit of the
common good, and for empathic connection to our political opponents.25
Those who favor abortion rights might find this scenario unappealing. For
those who believe that abortion access is a tool that a woman must wield in
order for her to determine her life course and the quality thereof, a system in
which the availability of this tool hinges on a national conversation is
unpalatable. Essentially, proponents of abortion rights do not trust political
dialogue to lead to the “right” answer to the question of whether a woman
should carry the pregnancy to term; instead, they trust women to arrive at their
own, personal right answer to the question of whether they should carry a
pregnancy to term.26
II.

GREENE-STYLE CONSTITUTIONAL NONOBLIGATION

Unlike Seidman, Greene does not advocate throwing established precedent,
and the Constitution generally, out the window. Rather, he offers a theory of
the Constitution that requires the accommodation of those who would prefer to
live their lives in a way that is inconsistent with the way the majority would
have them live.
It becomes obvious fairly quickly, however, that Greene’s proposal, if
followed, would have the practical effect of throwing out established precedent
as it relates to abortion rights. Greene argues that no one, including state and
local officials, is obliged to follow the Court’s interpretation of the
Constitution.27 Thus, although the Court in Roe interpreted the Constitution to
provide a woman with the right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy, and
although the Court affirmed that decision in Casey, all manner of
governmental actors can disagree with that interpretation. Accordingly, within
Greene’s proposal, it is legitimate for an official or lawmaking body to pass a
law prohibiting abortions in a jurisdiction as long as it argues that its own
independent review of the Constitution, contrary to the Court’s review of the
document, revealed it as containing no prohibition on the law at issue.28 The
25

Id. at 138.
It is possible that even in the current era of constitutional obedience, judges are relying
on these “extra-constitutional considerations” when they determine the constitutionality of
abortion regulations. That is, when the majority in Roe looked to precedent, found a right to
privacy, and determined that this right was broad enough to encompass the abortion
decision, it may have been motivated by extra-constitutional considerations such as
utilitarianism or some notion of individual liberty. Similarly, when Justice Rehnquist argued
in his dissent that the Constitution did not contain a fundamental right to privacy, he may
have been motivated by extra-constitutional considerations like biblical teachings or Kantian
ethics. Thus, the “pernicious myth” of constitutional obligation forces the obfuscation of the
actual motivations behind decisions.
27 GREENE, supra note 1, at 239-47.
28 Greene writes that officials should take into consideration a number of factors when
deciding whether to follow the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution. See id. at 223-28
26

1304

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:1297

Court retains the power to strike down the prohibition, of course,
understanding the law as an “interpretive challenge.”29 Greene writes that such
laws would “awaken the Court to its fallibility and, according to the strength of
the challenge, lead the Court to be more (or less) willing to reexamine its
doctrine.”30
There should be no doubt that, if Greene’s proposal were accepted, the
Court would face “interpretive challenges” to Roe and Casey often – perhaps
every term.31 Even if the Court reaffirmed the decisions subsequent to every
challenge, however, it would be hard to describe the state of affairs as one in
which women’s abortion rights were protected. Once the abortion prohibition
(arguing that officials should consider coordination and stability among officials, the level
of consensus within the Court, factors distinguishing cases, the persuasiveness of the
Court’s reasoning, generational participation in debating the issues, and officials’ positional
duties). Interestingly, many of the considerations that he itemizes do not support a fidelity to
the Court’s abortion precedent. He asserts that officials ought to obey precedent if
disobeying it means upsetting an established regulatory structure, id. at 223; disobeying Roe
and Casey, however, does not threaten governmental stability. He further conjectures:
Perhaps an official should adhere to constitutional principle announced by a 9-0 Court
vote more readily than she should a 5-4 one, and perhaps she should be more apt to
follow an opinion quickly adhered to across the country than one to which popular (and
official) resistance has been present from issuance.
Id. at 223-24. The fact that Casey managed to garner only a plurality of Justices, coupled
with the fact that Roe was hardly “quickly adhered to across the country,” suggests that an
official need not find themselves tethered to the opinions.
Greene also asserts that an official might not disobey an opinion that he finds persuasive.
Id. at 224 (“In deciding whether to challenge Court precedent, government officials should
consider the soundness of the Court’s reasoning in the relevant case(s), as judged by
standard interpretive norms.”). Suffice it to say that an official who believes that abortion is
a religious or moral wrong would probably not find his or her hands stayed by the soundness
of the Court’s reasoning in either Roe or Casey.
29 Id. at 248.
30 Id.
31 There are political groups whose entire purpose is to see the Court overturn Roe. See,
e.g., Why End Roe, ENDROE.ORG, http://www.endroe.org/home.aspx (last visited May 16,
2013). Legal scholars who support the anti-choice movement take issue with the Roe
Court’s constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Clarke D. Forsythe, A Legal Strategy to
Overturn Roe v. Wade After Webster: Some Lessons from Lincoln, 1991 BYU L. REV. 519,
531-34 (arguing that Roe overlooks an unborn child’s constitutional right to life); Raymond
B. Marcin, God’s Littlest Children and the Right to Live: The Case for a Positivist Pro-Life
Overturning of Roe, 25 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 38, 38-39 (2008) (arguing that the
Court should overturn Roe using anti-choice reasoning because that approach is stronger
than a federalism-based strategy). There are even those who support a woman’s right to
choose whether to end her pregnancy, but who disagree with the reasoning in Roe. See, e.g.,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1198-1200
(1992) (asserting that, had the Court simply based its striking down of abortion restrictions
in Roe on theories of equal protection, the decision would not have been subjected to
extreme controversy and criticism to the extent that it has been).
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passed, women in a jurisdiction would be without abortion access until the law
was challenged and the Court granted certiorari, heard the case, and issued its
decision.32 Abortion rights advocates would hardly find this alternate state of
affairs preferable to the current one.
But, perhaps Greene’s proposal would be more attractive to abortion rights
proponents if we imagine an alternate world in which Roe and Casey have
been overturned33 and a jurisdiction has passed a law prohibiting abortions
altogether or limiting access to them to a small number of circumstances. In
this world, Greene would allow individual women to seek exemptions from the
regulation through the judiciary.34 In order to be exempted from the law, a
woman would have to claim that the law’s application to her would burden the
exercise of her religion or force her to violate a deeply held “comprehensive
view”35 founded in some other normative authority, whether it be
“philosophical, cultural, family-based, etc.”36 Should the woman make a prima
facie showing for an exemption to the abortion ban, the government could
resist granting the exemption by showing that it has a compelling state interest
in enforcing the ban despite the woman’s normative convictions.37
Greene’s proposal is attractive insofar as it allows for the possibility of
women accessing abortion should Roe and Casey be overturned. The
likelihood of women actually accessing abortion, however, would be
frighteningly low; moreover, the burdens that they would have to face in order

32

Of course, challengers could seek a temporary injunction of the law while the case
wended its way to the Court. Lower courts, however – which, like state and local officials in
Greene’s proposal, do not have an obligation to follow Court precedent – would determine
whether or not to enjoin the law. Just as it is not unrealistic to believe that states would
challenge Roe and Casey if released from the yoke of obedience to Court precedent, it is not
unrealistic to believe that many lower courts would choose not to enjoin abortion
prohibitions.
33 It is worth noting that Greene does not advocate fidelity to Roe and Casey as a matter
of course, simply because they are precedent and women have relied on the decisions. See
GREENE, supra note 1, at 192 (“[I]f Roe and Casey were wrongly decided, that the
government could now protect fetal life and women might no longer have access to legal
abortions would be a correct state of affairs, and the resulting systemic costs would be
acceptable ones. If Roe and Casey are to be maintained, it should be on the merits, not
because they are extant precedent.”). But see Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (“[F]or two decades of economic and social developments, people
have organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of
themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event
that contraception should fail. The ability of women to participate equally in the economic
and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive
lives.”).
34 See GREENE, supra note 1, at 116.
35 Id. at 129.
36 Id. at 117.
37 See id. at 118.
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to gain that access would be exceedingly high. To begin, individual women
would have to plead for exemptions to judges on a case-by-case basis.38
Judges, then, would determine whether they believe the woman when she says
that being compelled to abide by the abortion prohibition – that is, being
compelled to bear a child – would violate some religious or other normative
conviction.39 It may suffice to say that it is hard to imagine that many women
would be successful in convincing anyone that a religious or normative
conviction would be burdened by carrying a pregnancy to term. Moreover,
even if judges believed that such a conviction existed, they would have the
latitude to decide that, although the conviction might be violated by the
abortion ban, the conviction is not central to the woman or the violation is not
substantial.40 The scenario is eerily reminiscent of the pre-Roe era, when
women had to plead for abortions from panels of doctors who were
empowered to determine whether her abortion was actually “medically
necessary.”41 Simply put, forcing a woman to try to convince someone that an
abortion is in her best interests demeans her and denies her decisionmaking
capacity.42
Even if a woman convinced a judge of her sincerity and made a prima facie
case for an exemption, a state could argue that it has a compelling interest in
nevertheless applying the law to the woman. Greene does not offer a theory of
how courts should determine whether or not the state’s asserted interest is
compelling. Thus, if his proposal were to be accepted, judges would
experience the same problems they do now with respect to deciding whether an
interest is weighty enough to justify infringing an individual liberty.43
Demonstrating the enduring nature of this problem, Greene uses an example of
religious observers who would like to engage in the ritual slaughter of animals
38

Id. at 130-32 (describing the requirement of “case-by-case judicial balancing”).
Id. at 129-30 (observing that courts may justifiably inquire into the sincerity of the
belief of a person asking for an exemption to a law).
40 Id. at 130-31 (stating that “there’s no reason . . . that centrality should not be part of
the inquiry into the nature and significance of the burden” and that courts should “inquire
into whether there’s a substantial burden” on the individual’s norms).
41 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 138-40 (1973).
42 See id. at 153 (explaining physical and psychological harms that may befall a woman
if she is not allowed to choose whether or not to end her pregnancy).
43 See Jed Rubenfeld, On the Legal Status of the Proposition That “Life Begins at
Conception,” 43 STAN. L. REV. 599, 603-04 (1991) (“On the whole, however, the
compelling state interest doctrine remains an unstructured balancing test in which our
constitutional guarantees may always give way to raisons d’état.”); see also T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 976 (1987)
(arguing that Justice Blackmun’s defense in Roe of viability as the point at which the state’s
interest in protecting fetal life becomes compelling “is a definition of viability, not an
explanation of value”); Ely, supra note 6, at 924 (“Exactly why [viability] is the magic
moment is not made clear . . . . [T]he Court’s defense seems to mistake a definition for a
syllogism.”).
39

2013] ABORTION ACCESS AND CONSTITUTIONAL INFIDELITY

1307

and who seek an exemption from a law requiring that all animals be stunned
prior to their killing.44 Should the state’s interest in protecting animals from
cruelty – and from dying unnecessarily painful deaths – trump the religious
observers’ interest in practicing their religion in the manner they believe it
ought to be practiced? He writes: “The case involving animal slaughter is
harder because we have to determine how to assess the interest in animal
welfare . . . . [T]here is a legitimate debate about the extent to which we must
consider animal welfare on a par with human welfare.”45 He ultimately
suggests that the state’s interest in animal welfare is not compelling and that
the exemption should be granted:
Exempting ritual slaughter from the stunning rules is a plausible way of
finding a middle ground between two claims of right – the claim on
behalf of the animals and the claim from religious truth. For those of us
who aren’t sure about either claim (in part because we’re neither nonhuman animals nor devout Jews or Muslims), the rule-plus-exemption
approach makes sense.46
But, what about fetuses? Just as “we have to determine how to assess the
interest in animal welfare” in Greene’s example, a judge would have to
determine how to assess the interest in fetal welfare. And just as “there is a
legitimate debate about the extent to which we must consider animal welfare
on a par with human welfare,” there is a legitimate debate about the extent to
which we must consider fetal welfare on a par with the welfare of human
beings capable of living independently of and externally to another human
being. Perhaps the difference between the example of animal slaughter and the
issue of abortion is that, while advocates of animal rights might admit that
there is some ambiguity to their claim as compared to the claim of religious
observers, advocates of fetal rights tend to express absolute conviction that
fetal interests should in most, if not all, cases trump the interests of women
bearing unwanted pregnancies. Moreover, the reverse is true of advocates of
women’s reproductive rights. Thus, the likelihood that opponents and
supporters of abortion would agree to a “middle ground” – in which there is a
rule prohibiting abortion, but exemptions are allowed for individual women
who make convincing arguments about their need to have their normative
convictions honored – is low.
CONCLUSION
Seidman concludes his analysis with the observation that perhaps the
illusion of obligation to the Constitution is necessary to keep the country from
spiraling into anarchy; perhaps it is necessary to keep the country united.47 He
44
45
46
47

GREENE, supra note 1, at 127.
Id.
Id.
SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 143.
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hopes not, however, writing: “We cannot know for sure until we give
constitutional disobedience a try. And that is reason enough to make the
effort.”48 But, as the above analysis reveals, an era of constitutional infidelity
would likely substantially reduce the level of abortion access that adult women
with the ability to pay enjoy in our present era of constitutional fidelity. For
those who believe that abortion access is paramount in ensuring that women
are able to participate in society as equals, the fact that constitutional infidelity
may render this access impossible may be reason enough to resist giving it a
try.

48

Id.

